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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the experience of 10 Asian countries with respect to growth, trade and FDI. 
It explores relationships between the nature of exports and imports and growth, as well as the 
relevance of FDI as a channel for these relationships. We find that FDI is often positively 
correlated with higher productivity levels in exports and imports. The effect for imports is 
particularly apparent for imported intermediate goods, reflecting the emergence of greater trade 
fragmentation. In turn, both imported intermediates and exports that are associated with higher 
productivity levels are positively correlated with per capita GDP. This paper therefore brings 
together empirical evidence that integrates discussions of FDI, trade fragmentation and 
improvements in the productivity of traded goods. 
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I. Introduction 
From 19
th
 century arguments about infant industry protection to recent exercises such as 
the World Bank’s well-known “East Asian Miracle” study, the various aspects of globalization in 
economic development have been endlessly analyzed and debated. Studies typically focus on 
different aspects of globalization, such as exports alone, or FDI alone, and use different 
empirical methodologies. For example, Rodrik (2006) stresses the role of exports that exceed (in 
a precise manner that we will define later) their “expected” productivity level, in explaining 
China’s growth success. While there is a specific and precise measure of export productivity in 
Rodrik’s analysis, his discussion of the positive role of FDI is brief and informal. On the other 
hand, Borensztein et al. (1998), for example, examine the impact of FDI on growth through 
cross-country regressions, finding that a positive impact depends on factors such as having 
sufficient levels of human capital in the recipient countries. But they have no role for trade in 
their empirical specifications.  
Of course, there are many studies that examine trade and FDI together. In theoretical 
modeling, the two are bound together, either as substitutes or as complements, depending on the 
nature of production networks and the associated FDI. Even in these cases, however, empirical 
examinations based on this theoretical modeling do not seem to treat trade and FDI in an 
integrated manner. This comes out in the literature reviews of Saggi (2002) and Keller (2009), 
for example. This problem cannot be solved completely, because trade and FDI data are 
available at very different levels of granularity. Nevertheless, our analysis makes some progress 
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in providing a more coherent and consistent empirical examination of trade and FDI in relation 
to economic development. 
Examinations of trade and productivity have recently begun to focus on imported 
intermediate goods, in contrast to the earlier emphasis on exporting as a driver of productivity 
and growth (e.g., Goldberg et al., 2009). Clearly, the nature of this trade is partly related to 
patterns of FDI, to the extent that it is driven by trade fragmentation or vertical specialization 
(though it need not be). These studies are typically micro-level analyses, using plant or firm level 
data, and do not consider the role of FDI. Again, our approach allows us to explore the possible 
linkages between FDI and trade fragmentation in an empirically consistent manner.
1
 
Our central empirical tool is the Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007) index of export 
productivity (also used by Rodrik, 2006), called EXPY. The precise index is described in Section 
III. This index measures the extent to which the export pattern of a country reflects the export of 
goods that have productivity levels that can be associated with higher income countries. We 
follow Hausmann et al. (2007) in examining the behavior of this index over time, and its 
relationship to per capita GDP. Our contribution here is to extend their approach to a longer time 
period for a specific set of countries. 
We go on to adapt the EXPY index to measure the productivity level of imports. This is 
an innovation that allows us to examine how the other side of trade flows can matter, and also 
connects more directly to the role and impact of inward FDI. We are able to divide imports into 
intermediates and other goods, allowing us to distinguish their different possible roles in 
development, as well as different possible relationships to FDI. In sum, our approach allows us 
to examine the productivity patterns of exports and imports in relation to income levels and FDI 
flows. 
                                                 
1
 For an overview of the evolution and role of FDI in East Asia, see Urata (2001). 
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Our empirical contribution can be viewed in the light of the ongoing debate about the role of 
trade (and government policy toward trade and industry) in the East Asian miracle: 
The East Asian Miracle (World Bank 1993a) …study puts strong emphasis on the 
importance of performance in manufactured goods exports. The study goes beyond simply 
arguing that rapid export growth played an important role in permitting East Asian 
economies to avoid foreign exchange constraints. It suggests that exports and export policies 
played a crucial role in stimulating growth. The authors challenge the view that simply 
striving for a neutral incentive structure was adequate. Instead, they advocate broad 
government support for exports as a “highly effective way of enhancing absorption of 
international best practice technology [and] thus boosting productivity and output 
growth.”… Although the study emphasizes exports as a channel for learning and 
technological advancement, conspicuously absent is a discussion of the role of imports and 
import competition in providing similar benefits. (Lawrence and Weinstein, 2001, pp. 379-
80) 
 
In their study, Lawrence and Weinstein examine aggregate time-series data for Japan and Korea 
to make the case for the importance of imports in the two countries’ growth experience. Again, 
our contribution differs in that we are able to take a more disaggregated view of trade, examine 
its productivity level and patterns of fragmentation, and correlate it with FDI flows. We also 
consider a larger sample of countries, giving a sense of patterns more in keeping with the intent 
of the East Asian miracle study. 
 The scope of our study is the eight economies considered in the World Bank (1993) 
study, augmented by the two emerging giants, China and India. Data limitations dictate the 
period that we use, 1984-2000 (with a couple of exceptions). This period captures the latter part 
of the East Asian miracle, as well as significant portions of the transitions of China and India 
toward being more open to foreign trade and capital, as well as domestically more market-
oriented. In section II, we provide an overview of some aspects of these economies’ experience 
during the period in question. Section III describes our data and methodology in some detail. 
Since we use data from several sources, necessitated by our conceptual scope as well as changes 
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in data categories over the period in question, preparing the data requires some care. We also 
explain our indices of trade “quality,” based on Hausmann et al. (2007), or based on extensions 
of those ideas. We focus on trade in manufactures in our analysis, rather than all commodity 
trade as in Hausmann et al., but results for all trade are similar to those presented below.  
Section IV describes our results. We find that the Asian countries in our sample have 
been relatively successful at upgrading the productivity level of their trade, consistent with the 
analysis of Hausmann et al., but for a different time period. By extending the Hausmann et al. 
approach to different types of exports (intermediate and other), and to imports, which are not 
considered by those authors, we find  that productivity levels in intermediate exports, other 
goods exports, and intermediate imports are highly correlated with GDP per capita; the three 
have a clear positive trend for most countries. Furthermore, the correlation between intermediate 
imports (respectively, intermediate and other goods exports) productivity levels and FDI inflows 
tends to be higher for more developed (respectively, less developed) Asian countries in our 
sample.Section V provides a summary conclusion. 
 
II. Historical Overview 
The well documented East Asian economic “miracle” is probably best appreciated by 
observing the growth in GDP per capita in the region. The countries examined all saw impressive 
growth in GDP per capita (see Figure II.1). PPP converted GDP per capita increased at an 
average annual growth rate (AAGR) of 4.2 percent in the 1984-2000 period. There was 
significant convergence in the region, a result of Japan’s stagnation and the high growth 
experienced by the Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) and China.  
In terms of GDP per capita, the fastest growing countries were China (7.6 percent), South Korea 
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(6.5 percent), and Taiwan (6.1 percent); the slowest growing countries were Japan (2.1 percent), 
Indonesia (3.0 percent), and India (3.2 percent). The Asian financial crisis had a significant effect 
on these economies, but China and the Asian Tigers were able to recover fairly quickly. This 
pattern continued and, even, accelerated in the post-2000 period, though we do not analyze that 
more recent experience in this paper. 
 
[Figure II.1 about here] 
 
Trade, especially trade in manufacturing, appears to have played significant role in this 
growth.  We focus on manufactured goods because it allows us to exclude commodities, which 
have a different role to play in development and industrialization. In all cases, total exports and 
imports grew at much faster rates than that of the GDP per capita. China experienced the fastest 
growth in both exports and imports (19 and 21 percent, respectively) and the slowest growing 
economies were Japan (7 percent each, respectively) and Indonesia (7 and 6 percent, 
respectively). Manufacturing trade, especially for exports, played a crucial role in this growth 
(see Table II.1). Manufactures grew at faster rates than overall trade. As can be seen in Table 
II.1, most of the countries in the sample experienced significant increases in the share of 
manufactures in overall merchandise trade. The only decreases were minor (Hong Kong, -1 
percent, and Japan -0.4 percent), and occurred in countries had had very high shares in 
manufacturing at the beginning of the period.  
There were a few noticeable drops in the share of manufacturing in imports over the 
period of analysis. For example, the share of manufactures in imports decreased in India 
(because of the increased importance of uncut/un-mounted diamonds, which the UNCTAD 
6 
 
classification does not consider to be manufacturing), China (because of the increase in 
petroleum imports), and Indonesia (also because of the large increase in petroleum imports) . 
Manufacturing exports in China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan accounted for more than 
90 percent of all exports by 2000. Indonesia had the lowest share (56 percent) and Japan had the 
highest share (96 percent).  On the import side, only Indonesia (61 percent), India (35 percent), 
Japan (56 percent), and Korea (61 percent) had shares lower than 75 percent. Although the share 
of manufacturing is not as high on the import side, the growth in share was in the double digits 
for most of the countries. Japan had the largest increase in the share of imported manufactures 
(33 percentage points), but it had the smallest share at the beginning of the period (23 percent). 
 
[Table II.1 about here] 
 
When splitting trade into intermediates and other goods, using the BEC classification, we 
see that intermediate trade patterns are not uniform across countries (See Figures II.2 and II.3).
2
 
For imports, the importance of intermediates in manufacturing decreased from 1984 until about 
the mid-1990s. They subsequently increased in importance, but, in many cases, had not 
recovered by 2000, or were at about the same level, as in the early 1980s. The largest decrease 
was of less than 11 percentage points (Japan). The only countries to increase the share of 
intermediates in imports over the period were India, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. 
Intermediate imports were, nevertheless, important and account for over 40 percent of all imports 
for all of the Asian countries in our sample. Characterizing the changes in intermediates in 
manufacturing exports is more difficult to generalize about, because some countries saw the 
                                                 
2
 We should note that the data is of a lower bound for intermediates, for more information see the data and 
methodology section 
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percentage share of intermediates decrease by double digits, while for other countries the share 
increased by double digits. The largest drop in intermediates’ exports share was almost 20 
percent (India) and the highest increase was 29 percent (Taiwan). Interestingly, Japan and the 
Asian Tigers increased their share, while the rests of the countries (including China) saw 
decreases. This is consistent with several studies that looked at intermediates and found that the 
share of intermediates in trade has decreased (Hummels et al., 2001). However, looking at the 
share of intermediate manufactures trade ignores the fact that not all intermediates are the same. 
The drop in the share of intermediates in the 1980s was a result of a drop in the importance of 
relatively low-tech intermediates (such as fabrics), while the increase in the 1990s was a result of 
increases in the importance of relatively higher-tech intermediates (such as electronic 
microcircuits). We quantify this difference in relative technological level embodied in each 
country’s imports and exports in the next section.3 
 
[Figure II.2 about here] 
[Figure II.3 about here] 
 
III. Data and Methodology  
The trade, GDP, and FDI data each comes from a separate source. We use trade data 
compiled and standardized by Feenstra, Lipsey, Deng, Ma, and Mo (2005). The data contain 
bilateral trade data for 1962-2000, classified as Standard International Trade Classification, 
revision 2 (SITC, Rev. 2) and disaggregated at the four-digit level. The bilateral data is 
                                                 
3
 To provide a concrete sense of the major exports and imports of the sample countries, we provide “top ten” tables 
for each in the appendix. 
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aggregated to create multilateral data, which is what we use in our analysis.
4
 The pre-1984 data 
were originally classified by SITC Rev.1 and had to be converted to SITC Rev. 2 by the authors; 
to avoid any concordance issues, we will only focus on the data beginning in 1984 and ending in 
2000.
5
 We should note that the data excludes SITC four-digit categories that did not exceed 
$100,000 per year. The PPP adjusted GDP per capita data are from the Penn World Tables and 
are in constant 2005 US dollars. For FDI we use UNCTAD’s data on FDI inflows as a percent of 
GDP for the same period as the trade data. The only exception is for Indonesia, which did not 
report FDI inflows as a percent of GDP during the period in question, and is excluded from the 
analysis of FDI. 
The calculations required two concordances: SITC to manufacturing and SITC to BEC. 
First, to determine which SITC products are classified as manufacturing, we used UCTAD’s 
definition for manufacturing.
6
  Second, to determine which SITC goods were intermediates and 
which were “other goods”, we used the UN’s classification by Broad Economic Categories 
(BEC), which allows us to separate the data into intermediates, consumption, capital, and not 
classified (see Table III.1). The BEC concordance is in SITC Rev. 3, while the trade data is in 
SITC Rev. 2. As a result we ended up with three trade categories: Intermediate, Others, and 
Mixed. “Mixed” refers to categories that include both intermediate and other goods in the 
different SITC revisions, and it tends to be a fairly small and consistent category (the data can be 
provided upon request). The share of goods classified as Mixed varied significantly, but was 
                                                 
4
 The Feenstra et al. trade data are bilateral. They use multiple sources for this base data (e.g., they believe importer 
data is more accurate) to avoid issues such as re-exports. We aggregate the bilateral data into multilateral data (i.e., 
getting world totals by SITC sector).  
5
 There are two exceptions to this: 1) China; which starts in 1987 because a significant amount of data were not 
disaggregate before that date and 2) India, which ends in 1999 because India data for imports were not separated in 
2000. 
6
 SITC 5 (Chemicals and related products), 6(Manufactured goods), 7 (machinery and transport equipment), and 8 
(Miscellaneous manufactured articles), less 667 (pearls, precious & semi-precious stones) and 68 (non-ferrous 
metals). 
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between 8 (Malaysia) and 25 (China) percent of total exports and between 16 (Singapore) and 23 
(Taiwan) percent of total imports. Including Mixed as intermediates or as “others” did not 
change our results much and we chose to leave the “mixed” trade data out of the current analysis. 
The trade in the categories used in our analysis still accounts for at a minimum of three-fourths 
of aggregate trade. 
 
[Table III.1 about here] 
 
To analyze the role of different aspects of trade in the Asian development success, we 
make use of Hausmann et al.’s (2007) framework to establish a hierarchy in goods in terms of 
their implied productivity. The quantitative index requires two steps. Step 1 is to rank the traded 
goods in terms of their implied productivity. They refer to this measure as PRODY and it is 
calculated by taking a weighted average of the per-capita GDP of a product’s exporters.  The 
weights used are the revealed comparative advantage of each county in that commodity. As 
PRODY gives the “income/productivity level” of a commodity, the higher the PRODY, the 
higher the average income level of its exporters. We define good i’s  share of total exports by 
country j as           ∑      and good i’s share of total imports by country j as       
    ∑     , where     is the value of export i by country j and    is the value of import i by 
country j. Thus, ∑      & ∑      are total manufacturing exports and imports, respectively.  The 
formula for PRODY is: 
 
       ∑ (
     
∑       
)                  
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  Step 2 is to calculate the average “income/productivity level” for each country’s trade 
basket. Hausmann et al. refer to this measurement for exports as EXPY and note that it measures 
“…the productivity level associated with a country’s specialization pattern.” Since we are also 
looking at the import side we calculate two productivity level variables EXPY and IMPY. They 
are the weighted sum of the PRODY for each country. The weights are, respectively, the share of 
each good in country j’s total exports and total imports in manufacturing. Therefore, in our 
analysis, we have introduced IMPY as the import analogue of EXPY. The two measures are 
calculated using the following formulas: 
 
      ∑              
 
 
      ∑              
 
 
 
Note that, since we are using PRODY as a measurement for the productivity level, we use 
PRODY created from exporters to calculate both EXPY for exports and IMPY for imports.  
Hausmann et al. chose to compare the implied productivity at a point in time across 
different countries (with varying GDP per capita). For example, Hausmann et al. find that 
“EXPY is a strong robust predictor of subsequent economic growth, controlling for standard 
covariates.” They also find that, compared to the world average, India and China are outliers. 
We, on the other hand, examine a relatively small number of countries and see how trade 
patterns in these countries have evolved over time, compared to each other. We also examine 
different types of exports, imports, and FDI inflows in tracing the evolution of these trade 
patterns.  
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IV. Results 
In this section we analysis and compare the EXPY and IMPY in manufacturing for the 
Asian countries with GDP per capita, growth over time, and FDI inflows. First, we follow 
Hausmann et al. in comparing EXPY for exports (and IMPY for imports) relative to GDP per 
capita.  We find that the less developed Asian countries in the sample are somewhat distinct, 
relative to the average trend of the other Asian economies in this group. This is consistent with 
Hausmann et al.’s finding. Second, we see how the IMPY and EXPY for imports and exports 
have changed over time. We find that when we look across time, China and some of the other 
Asian countries have achieved significant increases in their EXPY and IMPY, but Japan and the 
Asian Tigers are the ones who stand out as having the highest EXPY (this pattern is not as 
pronounced for IMPY). Finally, we look at the connection between EXPY or IMPY on the one 
hand, and FDI inflows on the other; we find that, in almost every case, both EXPY and IMPY 
are significantly and positively correlated with FDI inflows. The correlation appears to be 
stronger among intermediate products than among other products. 
 We begin with Figures IV.1 through IV.4, which display patterns of relationships 
between EXPY and IMPY on the one hand (for each of the two categories of goods – 
intermediate and other) and GDP per capita on the other. Both categories of exports display a 
strong positive relationship between EXPY and per capita GDP. On the other hand, this positive 
relationship only appears for intermediate imports when comparing IMPY with per capita GDP.
7
  
 It is interesting to note that China, India, Thailand, Malaysia, and, to a lesser extent, 
Indonesia appear to be in a different group when comparing EXPY and IMPY with GDP per 
                                                 
7
 Our results with respect to intermediate imports may also be seen as complementing analyses of the development 
impacts of trade in capital goods, such as Eaton and Kortum (2001) and Alfaro and Hammel (2007). 
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capita (See Figure IV.1 to IV.4).
8
 That is, for their per capita GDP, these countries appear to be 
at EXPY levels higher than their Asian counterparts (Japan and the Asian Tigers) were at the 
same GDP per capita level. Does that mean these countries found a way to increase EXPY/IMPY 
for a given GDP per capita or that the technological barriers to trade have gone down over time 
allowing these lesser developed countries to export more sophisticated products? Hausmann et 
al. suggest that it is first, but the literature on trade fragmentation would favor the latter 
explanation.  
We conjecture that the observed pattern is a combination of the two explanations, with 
the key link being FDI. During the period being analyzed, these Asian countries have been more 
receptive to FDI, have opened up their markets, and demanded more technology transfer.
9
 At the 
same time, lower tariffs, lower transportation costs, and lower communication costs have 
allowed intermediate goods to increase substantially in trade.  
Since intermediates have not increased as fast as other goods for several of the countries 
in the sample (see Section II, and Table II.2), the fact that EXPY and IMPY have increased 
means than the composition of intermediates has changed substantially. Since the changes in 
composition have tended towards more high-tech intermediates, these products are the ones that 
have tended to benefit from the lower trade costs and the various government policies. Finally, 
with trade fragmentation, it is conceivable that some of the increases in EXPY are due to 
increased IMPY, since export upgrading is based on importing more complex intermediate 
goods. The iPod, a product “made” in China, is a clear example of this (Linden, Dedrick, and 
Kraemer, 2011). 
 
                                                 
8
 In order to make the figures intelligible, we do not display the data for every year, but only for the first, middle and 
last years of the sample. 
9
 For an example, see Swenson (2011). 
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[Figure IV.1 to IV.4 about here] 
 
 The patterns in Figures IV.1 to IV.4 can be investigated through examining the 
correlations between the variables, reported in Table IV.1. We find that GDP per capita and 
EXPY are highly correlated (this is consistent with Hausmann et al.). In fact, the EXPY for both 
intermediate and other exports are highly correlated with GDP per capita. The correlation is 
positive and significant in every case, with the sole exception of “other goods” for Hong Kong.  
Interestingly, the correlation between the IMPY for intermediate imports and GDP per capita is 
also strong, positive, and significant in many cases. There are, however, a few exceptions; the 
correlation is not significant for India, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Thailand. The correlation between 
the IMPY for other imports and GDP per capita is not significant in most cases. The only 
exceptions are Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan. The correlation is actually negative and 
significant for Taiwan. It is interesting to note that for both Malaysia and Taiwan the correlation 
is not significant for intermediate imports, but it is for other imports.  For Malaysia, the reason 
may be the country’s increased reliance on non-intermediate imports. For Taiwan, the negative 
sign on the correlation of IMPY for other goods imports is perplexing. 
 To see if part of the reason that the less developed countries in the sample stand out from 
the others is shifts in the technological frontier, we examine how EXPY and IMPY change over 
time (Figures IV.5 through IV.8). Looking at the data in this dimension, it becomes quite clear 
that for EXPY the less developed countries (including China) are not outliers, but are, in fact, 
below the East Asian average. A major reason might be that the less developed economies in the 
sample have not reached development levels required to export more technologically advanced 
products. The fact that EXPY and IMPY are so high relative to GDP per capita may be a result 
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of the breakup of the production chain (trade fragmentation), lower production costs (better, 
more inexpensive technology), or lower trade costs (transportation costs, high tariffs, and non-
tariff barriers).   
Nonetheless, it is also clear that the EXPY has increased at impressive rates for exports 
(see Figures IV.5 and IV.6). This applies to both intermediates and others. These figures appear 
to show that all the countries are converging towards one point for intermediates. China, India, 
and Indonesia have the lowest EXPY at the end of the period, but these were also the countries 
with the fastest growing EXPY.  The increase in EXPY for “other goods” exports is quite large 
(five countries increased EXPY by at least 5,000 US$). It is no wonder that this increase in 
productivity level has been noticed, even in the popular press.
10
 There are some exceptions; 
China, Indonesia, Hong Kong, and Japan had relatively little or no growth in EXPY for this 
category. However, the reasons for this lack of growth are very different among this subgroup. In 
particular, Japan had the largest EXPY at the beginning of the period, and was still in the top 
three by the end of the period.  Although China, Indonesia, and Hong Kong may not have 
increased as much as the others, they have managed to match the rest of the sample countries in 
their EXPY for intermediate exports.  
 
[Figure IV.5 about here] 
[Figure IV.6 about here] 
 
                                                 
10
 For example, see the New York Times article of January 21, 2012, “How the U.S. Lost out on iPhone Work,” 
which reflects the combination of FDI, trade fragmentation and export productivity upgrading in the context of 
China’s role as a base for iPhone production. (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/business/apple-america-and-a-
squeezed-middle-class.html) 
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How is it that the EXPY for “other goods” exports increased by such large amounts? It is 
conceivable, with trade fragmentation, that part of the large increase in the EXPY for exports 
was led by the increase in the IMPY for imports. Several studies find that foreign content in 
some countries’ exports has increased over time (for examples of this phenomenon, see 
Hummels, Ishii, and Yi, 2001; and Dean, Fung, and Zhi, 2008).  Our results also show that the 
imported intermediates have also increased in productivity level, as measured by IMPY, 
something that has received little attention in the literature (see Figure IV.7). India is the only 
country where IMPY does not have a strong positive trend during the period (which may be 
related to its poor performance in the EXPY for “other goods” exports). By the end of the period, 
the countries with the lowest IMPY for intermediate imports were India, Hong Kong, and China. 
China, however, began to experience a large increase in IMPY toward the end of the 1990s. For 
the most part, it appears that the IMPY for other imports is fairly constant (see Figure IV.8). It is 
noteworthy that most of the Asian countries in the sample had IMPY levels for imports that were 
at the same technological level during the whole period and that “other goods” imports into 
Hong Kong and Japan were significantly less technologically advanced that those of the other 
countries.   
 
[Figure IV.7 about here] 
[Figure IV.8 about here] 
 
 What role has FDI played in this technological upgrading? FDI is arguably a key driver 
of trade fragmentation. In China, for example, foreign invested enterprises perform the majority 
of processing trade (trade that uses imported intermediates) and do very little in regular trade 
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(Dean, Lovely, and Mora, 2009). There are case studies, such as the iPod example, that find 
examples of FDI leading to technological upgrading in imports and exports. However, rigorous 
econometric analysis rarely looks at the link between technological upgrading and FDI, focusing 
more on increases in exports or imports.  To see if there is a connection between FDI and 
upgrading  we compare the respective correlations between EXPY and IMPY and FDI inflows 
(as a percent of GDP). The EXPY and IMPY correlations with FDI inflows (see Table IV.2) are 
smaller than their correlations with GDP per capita. They are, nonetheless, statistically 
significant in many cases, and fairly high in magnitude. In general, for both intermediate and 
other goods exports, the correlation between EXPY and FDI inflows is strongest for the less 
developed economies in the sample (especially for China and India). The correlations, although 
positive, are not significant for Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan; South Korea has a strong positive 
and significant correlation for both intermediates and other goods exports; and Hong Kong has a 
strong positive and significant correlation for the intermediates EXPY and a positive, but not 
significant, correlation for other goods EXPY. The correlation appears to be higher for 
intermediate exports than for other goods exports. Malaysia, again, has a negative and significant 
correlation between the EXPY for intermediate exports in manufacturing and FDI inflows.  
 The correlation between IMPY and FDI inflows (as a percent of GDP) is not as strong, 
nor as significant, as the correlation between EXPY and FDI inflows. It is interesting to note 
that, in contrast to the findings for EXPY, the correlation is not significant for the less developed 
Asian economies of our sample. The correlation for intermediate imports is fairly strong, 
positive, and significant for Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, and Singapore. The correlation between 
IMPY for “other goods” imports and FDI inflows is only significant in two cases: Singapore and 
Thailand, and it is negative in the latter case. The fact that the correlation is negative and 
17 
 
significant for Thailand is perplexing (especially because the correlations were strong, positive, 
and significant for EXPY).  
The heterogeneity of the correlations among the sample of countries is presumably a 
result of how important FDI is to each country and the sectors targeted by the FDI inflows. For 
example, FDI may be complementary to certain types of trade, and a substitute for others. The 
latter happens when FDI is motivated by the desire to reduce trade costs of exporting to the host 
country. On the other hand, if FDI is motivated by setting up production for exporting, then FDI 
and exports can move together.
11
 In these kinds of models or empirical exercises, trade effects 
are measured in terms of quantitative impacts. On the other hand, the focus of the analysis here is 
on the complexity or productivity of trade. The correlations in Table IV.2 indicate that the higher 
income countries in the sample tend to have higher FDI being associated with more complex 
intermediate goods imports: these might be sophisticated engineering equipment, for example. 
For the lower income countries in the sample, the export impacts are more pronounced. In both 
cases, however, there is still unexplained variation across countries with similar income levels. 
 
V. Conclusion 
In reviewing the development experience of several Asian economies, specifically with 
respect to their FDI, trade fragmentation and trade upgrading, we find that these countries have 
been relatively successful at upgrading the productivity level of their exports and their 
intermediate imports. Although we do not identify the causal link, it is clear that export and 
import productivity levels are highly correlated with GDP per capita. Whatever the causal link 
may be, we find that, for the Asian economies in our sample, intermediate export productivity 
                                                 
11
 Blonigen (2001) finds evidence of substitution as well as complementarity between affiliate production and 
exports of Japanese automobile parts for the US market. 
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levels are converging; there are many successful cases of improved final goods export 
productivity levels; and there are strong positive trends for intermediate import productivity 
levels.  
FDI may arguably be a driver for the upgrading of trade productivity levels, but the role 
varies by country.  In general, for the less developed Asian economies in our sample, we find 
that FDI is highly correlated with the increases in productivity growth in exports. For the more 
developed Asian economies, however, this correlation tends to be higher for increases in 
productivity of intermediate imports.  
Our findings have potential policy implications. First, FDI may play a significant role in 
technological upgrading and the sectors receiving this FDI may determine whether intermediate 
goods or other goods increase in productivity levels. Second, trade costs (especially tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers) may stunt the productivity levels of exports by increasing the costs of 
intermediates used by local producers or by discouraging FDI that seeks to take advantage of 
vertical specialization. Policymakers should take these possibilities into account when setting 
trade policies.  
Future research can focus on several areas. For example, detailed econometric studies are 
needed to identify the causal link between FDI and technological upgrading of both imports and 
exports. This would involve identifying the specific sectors receiving FDI and to see if this FDI 
is indeed driving some of the patterns we identify in our analysis. Finally, it would also be 
interesting to disaggregate the data by trading partner. For example, in the case of exports, are 
higher technology goods destined for countries in the North or the South? Is this pattern different 
for intermediates versus other goods? And in the case of imports, what is the origin of the higher-
19 
 
tech intermediate goods imports? Has trade fragmentation opened up new opportunities or new 
challenges for lesser developed countries? These are all questions worth exploring. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure II.1: PPP Converted GDP per capita, 1984-2000 (Constant 2005 US$) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure II.2: Intermediate Imports in Manufacturing (share of Total Imports) 
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Figure II.3: Intermediate Exports in Manufacturing (Share of Total Exports) 
 
 
 
 
Figure IV.1. Intermediate Exports Vs. GDP per capita (1984, 1992, and 2000) 
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Figure IV.2. EXPY for Other Exports Vs. GDP per capita (1984, 1992, and 2000) 
 
 
 
 
Figure IV.3. IMPY for Intermediate Imports Vs. GDP per capita (1984, 1992, and 2000) 
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Figure IV.4. IMPY for Other Imports Vs. GDP per capita (1984, 1992, and 2000) 
 
 
 
 
Figure IV.5 EXPY for Intermediate Exports 
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Figure IV.6. EXPY for Other Exports   
 
 
 
 
Figure IV.7. IMPY for Intermediate Imports 
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Figure IV.8. IMPY for Other Imports 
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Table II.1. Share of Manufacturing in Total Exports and Imports 
   Exports Imports 
code 1984 2000 Difference 1984 2000 Difference 
CHN 62  91  29  82  75  (6) 
HKG 92  91  (1) 75  86  11  
IDN 8  56  48  64  61  (4) 
IND 38  61  22  43  35  (8) 
JPN 96  96  (0) 23  56  33  
KOR 90  90  0  55  61  6  
MYS 26  83  56  73  84  11  
SGP 50  82  32  53  81  28  
THA 29  76  47  59  75  16  
TWN 90  95  5  57  79  22  
Note: Data for China starts in 1987 and data for India ends in from 1999 
 
Table II.2. Share of Intermediates in Manufacturing Exports and Imports 
  Exports Imports 
code 1984 2000 Difference 1984 2000 Difference 
CHN 28  24  (4) 55  65  10  
HKG 17  36  19  49  44  (5) 
IDN 40  39  (0) 70  64  (5) 
IND 66  46  (20) 53  64  11  
JPN 35  46  10  54  43  (11) 
KOR 38  53  15  53  61  7  
MYS 72  57  (15) 57  71  14  
SGP 53  57  4  55  61  6  
THA 51  45  (7) 65  69  4  
TWN 27  56  29  63  52  (10) 
Note: Data for China starts in 1987 and data for India ends in from 1999 
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Table III.1. Current BEC and SNA classes of goods 
 
Classification by Broad Economic Categories 
Basic classes of 
goods in SNA 
1 Food and beverages 
 
 
11 Primary 
 
  
111 Mainly for industry Intermediate Intermediate 
  
112 Mainly for household consumption Consumption 
 
12 – Processed 
 
  
121 Mainly for industry Intermediate Intermediate 
  
122 Mainly for household consumption Consumption 
2 Industrial supplies not elsewhere specified 
 
 
21 Primary Intermediate Intermediate 
 
22 Processed Intermediate Intermediate 
3 Fuels and lubricants 
 
 
31 Primary Intermediate Intermediate 
 
32 Processed 
 
  
321 Motor spirit Not classified Not classified 
  
322 Other Intermediate Intermediate 
4 Capital goods (except transport equipment), and parts and accessories thereof 
 
 
41 Capital goods (except transport equipment) Capital Capital 
 
42 Parts and accessories Intermediate Intermediate 
5 ‐ Transport equipment and parts and accessories thereof 
 
 
51 Passenger motor cars Not classified Not classified 
 
52 Other 
 
  
521 Industrial Capital Capital 
  
522 Non‐industrial Consumption Consumption 
 
53 Parts and accessories Intermediate Intermediate 
6 Consumer goods not elsewhere specified 
 
 
61 Durable Consumption Consumption 
 
62 Semi‐durable Consumption Consumption 
 
63 Non‐durable Consumption Consumption 
7 ‐ Goods not elsewhere specified Not classified Not classified 
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Table IV.1. Correlation between GDP per capita and EXPY/IMPY in Manufacturing 
Flow Class CHN HKG IDN IND JPN KOR MYS SGP TWN THA 
E
X
P
 
I 0.9727* 0.9025* 0.7675* 0.9622* 0.9769* 0.9778* 0.2758 0.9128* 0.9802* 0.9160* 
O 0.9697* 0.3693 0.8475* 0.6002* 0.9033* 0.9726* 0.9756* 0.9368* 0.9941* 0.9755* 
IM
P
 
I 0.8999* 0.9533* 0.7096* 0.3862 0.7433* 0.5795* 0.2013 0.9572* 0.4053 -0.0929 
O 0.5013 -0.0032 0.4814 0.1582 -0.1912 0.4661 0.4936* 0.8721* -0.6412* -0.2575 
* 5% significance level 
 
 
 
 
Table IV.2. Correlation between FDI inflows (% of GDP) and EXPY/IMPY in Manufacturing 
Flow Class CHN HKG IND JPN KOR MYS SGP TWN THA 
E
X
P
 
I 0.7857* 0.5085* 0.8133* 0.3735 0.6485* -0.4826* 0.3934 0.3451 0.5159* 
O 0.6644* 0.1755 0.7942* 0.2351 0.6952* 0.5416* 0.4444 0.3500 0.5457* 
IM
P
 
I 0.4428 0.5229* 0.4812 0.6982* 0.7729* -0.4194 0.5753* 0.4705 -0.3866 
O 0.0896 0.1316 0.1874 0.3964 0.3737 0.0236 0.6643* 0.1566 -0.4973* 
* 5% significance level 
Note: Data on FDI inflows (% GDP) for Indonesia is missing. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Top Ten Exports in 1999 
 
country class sitc2 description value PRODY 
C
h
in
a 
M 8942 CHILDRENS TOYS,INDOOR GAMES,ETC. 24,590,510 13,995 
O 8510 FOOTWEAR 18,749,789 6,470 
I 7599 PARTS OF AND ACCESSORIES SUITABLE FOR 751.2-,752- 10,296,961 14,434 
O 8310 TRAVEL GOODS,HANDBAGS,BRIEF-CASES,PURSES,SHEATHS 9,490,894 8,162 
O 8451 JERSEYS,PULL-OVERS,TWINSETS,CARDIGANS,KNITTED 7,697,577 4,012 
O 7525 PERIPHERAL UNITS,INCL.CONTROL & ADAPTING UNITS 7,297,261 14,228 
M 8939 MISCELLANEOUS ART.OF MATERIALS OF DIV.58 5,559,173 18,789 
O 8439 OTHER OUTER GARMENTS OF TEXTILE FABRICS 5,554,139 4,881 
I 7649 PARTS OF APPARATUS OF DIVISION 76- 5,283,397 15,621 
M 7712 OTHER ELECTRIC POWER MACHINERY,PARTS OF 771- 4,936,128 13,050 
C
h
in
a 
H
K
 S
A
R
 
I 7764 ELECTRONIC MICROCIRCUITS 4,275,384 17,052 
I 7599 PARTS OF AND ACCESSORIES SUITABLE FOR 751.2-,752- 2,969,879 14,434 
O 8451 JERSEYS,PULL-OVERS,TWINSETS,CARDIGANS,KNITTED 2,712,731 4,012 
O 8439 OTHER OUTER GARMENTS OF TEXTILE FABRICS 1,676,353 4,881 
M 8851 WATCHES,WATCH MOVEMENTS AND CASES 1,519,618 22,093 
M 8942 CHILDRENS TOYS,INDOOR GAMES,ETC. 1,504,373 13,995 
O 8973 JEWELLERY OF GOLD,SILVER OR PLATINUM 1,381,675 7,939 
O 8462 UNDER GARMENTS,KNITTED OF COTTON 1,086,441 4,521 
M 7788 OTHER ELECT.MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 1,032,287 13,171 
I 6522 COTTON FABRICS,WOVEN,BLEACH.MERCERIZ.DYED,PRINTED 936,002 8,098 
In
d
ia
 
M 6513 COTTON YARN 1,422,014 3,743 
O 8973 JEWELLERY OF GOLD,SILVER OR PLATINUM 1,044,606 7,939 
O 6584 BED LINEN,TABLE LINEN,TOILET & KITCHEN LINEN ETC. 768,543 5,950 
O 8462 UNDER GARMENTS,KNITTED OF COTTON 755,072 4,521 
O 8441 SHIRTS,MENS,OF TEXTILE FABRICS 676,076 3,080 
O 8435 BLOUSES OF TEXTILE FABRICS 643,912 4,518 
O 8439 OTHER OUTER GARMENTS OF TEXTILE FABRICS 571,569 4,881 
O 8481 ART.OF APPAREL & CLOTHING ACCESSORIES,OF LEATHER 509,505 5,374 
M 5417 MEDICAMENTS(INCLUDING VETERINARY MEDICAMENTS) 506,859 20,926 
I 6522 COTTON FABRICS,WOVEN,BLEACH.MERCERIZ.DYED,PRINTED 502,823 8,098 
In
d
o
n
es
ia
 
I 6342 PLYWOOD CONSISTING OF SHEETS OF WOOD 2,735,111 6,861 
O 8510 FOOTWEAR 1,865,958 6,470 
O 8219 OTHER FURNITURE AND PARTS 1,108,464 12,395 
I 7599 PARTS OF AND ACCESSORIES SUITABLE FOR 751.2-,752- 912,272 14,434 
I 6412 PRINTING PAPER & WRITING PAPER,IN ROLLS OR SHEETS 887,605 22,352 
O 7525 PERIPHERAL UNITS,INCL.CONTROL & ADAPTING UNITS 865,212 14,228 
O 7638 OTHER SOUND RECORDERS AND REPRODUCERS 811,759 15,030 
I 6415 PAPER AND PAPERBOARD,IN ROLLS OR SHEETS,N.E.S. 774,986 20,324 
I 7649 PARTS OF APPARATUS OF DIVISION 76- 749,020 15,621 
O 8439 OTHER OUTER GARMENTS OF TEXTILE FABRICS 730,930 4,881 
Ja
p
an
 
O 7810 PASSENGER MOTOR CARS,FOR TRANSPORT OF PASS.& GOOD 57,271,654 16,660 
I 7764 ELECTRONIC MICROCIRCUITS 24,731,586 17,052 
I 7849 OTHER PARTS & ACCESSORIES OF MOTOR VEHICLES 14,698,404 19,647 
I 7599 PARTS OF AND ACCESSORIES SUITABLE FOR 751.2-,752- 13,130,106 14,434 
M 7284 MACH.& APPLIANCES FOR SPEZIALIZED PARTICULAR IND. 10,948,210 19,017 
I 7649 PARTS OF APPARATUS OF DIVISION 76- 10,225,946 15,621 
M 7788 OTHER ELECT.MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 9,713,834 13,171 
O 7638 OTHER SOUND RECORDERS AND REPRODUCERS 9,475,341 15,030 
O 7932 SHIPS,BOATS AND OTHER VESSELS 9,467,473 11,211 
O 7525 PERIPHERAL UNITS,INCL.CONTROL & ADAPTING UNITS 8,991,797 14,228 
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K
o
re
a 
R
ep
. 
I 7764 ELECTRONIC MICROCIRCUITS 17,875,244 17,052 
O 7810 PASSENGER MOTOR CARS,FOR TRANSPORT OF PASS.& GOOD 9,372,667 16,660 
O 7643 RADIOTELEGRAPHIC & RADIOTELEPHONIC TRANSMITTERS 4,772,204 20,363 
O 7932 SHIPS,BOATS AND OTHER VESSELS 4,640,971 11,211 
I 7599 PARTS OF AND ACCESSORIES SUITABLE FOR 751.2-,752- 4,516,730 14,434 
O 7525 PERIPHERAL UNITS,INCL.CONTROL & ADAPTING UNITS 4,477,254 14,228 
I 6531 FABRICS,WOVEN OF CONTINUOUS SYNTH.TEXTIL.MATERIALS 3,166,282 10,051 
O 7524 DIGITAL CENTRAL STORAGE UNITS,SEPARATELY CONSIGNED 3,140,025 16,289 
I 7649 PARTS OF APPARATUS OF DIVISION 76- 2,399,884 15,621 
I 6552 KNITTED/CROCHETED FABRICS OF FIBRES OTH.THAN SYNTH 1,992,552 9,384 
M
al
ay
si
a 
I 7764 ELECTRONIC MICROCIRCUITS 16,619,652 17,052 
I 7599 PARTS OF AND ACCESSORIES SUITABLE FOR 751.2-,752- 9,396,094 14,434 
O 7524 DIGITAL CENTRAL STORAGE UNITS,SEPARATELY CONSIGNED 4,986,819 16,289 
O 7525 PERIPHERAL UNITS,INCL.CONTROL & ADAPTING UNITS 2,553,217 14,228 
O 7638 OTHER SOUND RECORDERS AND REPRODUCERS 2,182,045 15,030 
I 7763 DIODES,TRANSISTORS AND SIM.SEMI-CONDUCTOR DEVICES 2,138,164 12,103 
O 7628 OTHER RADIO-BROADCAST RECEIVERS 1,964,173 12,516 
O 7523 COMPLETE DIGITAL CENTRAL PROCESSING UNITS 1,893,200 24,163 
I 7649 PARTS OF APPARATUS OF DIVISION 76- 1,837,646 15,621 
O 7611 TELEVISION RECEIVERS,COLOUR 1,582,574 14,250 
S
in
g
ap
o
re
 
O 7524 DIGITAL CENTRAL STORAGE UNITS,SEPARATELY CONSIGNED 12,363,981 16,289 
I 7764 ELECTRONIC MICROCIRCUITS 11,771,117 17,052 
I 7599 PARTS OF AND ACCESSORIES SUITABLE FOR 751.2-,752- 8,273,697 14,434 
O 7523 COMPLETE DIGITAL CENTRAL PROCESSING UNITS 2,551,731 24,163 
O 7525 PERIPHERAL UNITS,INCL.CONTROL & ADAPTING UNITS 2,452,324 14,228 
I 7768 PIEZO-ELECTRIC CRYSTALS,MOUNTED,PARTS OF 776- 1,490,692 15,380 
O 7528 OFF-LINE DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT. N.E.S. 1,405,417 23,176 
I 7649 PARTS OF APPARATUS OF DIVISION 76- 1,285,399 15,621 
M 7788 OTHER ELECT.MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 1,238,413 13,171 
O 8983 GRAMOPHONE RECORDS AND SIM.SOUND RECORDINGS 1,205,298 25,318 
T
ai
w
an
 
I 7599 PARTS OF AND ACCESSORIES SUITABLE FOR 751.2-,752- 13,294,784 14,434 
I 7764 ELECTRONIC MICROCIRCUITS 13,201,899 17,052 
O 7522 COMPLETE DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING MACHINES 4,288,036 24,050 
O 7525 PERIPHERAL UNITS,INCL.CONTROL & ADAPTING UNITS 4,266,756 14,228 
O 7523 COMPLETE DIGITAL CENTRAL PROCESSING UNITS 3,878,125 24,163 
I 7722 PRINTED CIRCUITS AND PARTS THEREOF 2,295,402 13,784 
I 6552 KNITTED/CROCHETED FABRICS OF FIBRES OTH.THAN SYNTH 2,101,460 9,384 
I 6531 FABRICS,WOVEN OF CONTINUOUS SYNTH.TEXTIL.MATERIALS 1,965,487 10,051 
M 7788 OTHER ELECT.MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 1,889,128 13,171 
M 8939 MISCELLANEOUS ART.OF MATERIALS OF DIV.58 1,833,581 18,789 
T
h
ai
la
n
d
 
O 7524 DIGITAL CENTRAL STORAGE UNITS,SEPARATELY CONSIGNED 4,211,867 16,289 
I 7764 ELECTRONIC MICROCIRCUITS 3,510,486 17,052 
I 7599 PARTS OF AND ACCESSORIES SUITABLE FOR 751.2-,752- 3,205,052 14,434 
O 7525 PERIPHERAL UNITS,INCL.CONTROL & ADAPTING UNITS 2,338,450 14,228 
O 7821 MOTOR VEHICLES FOR TRANSPORT OF GOODS/MATERIALS 1,107,166 16,254 
I 7649 PARTS OF APPARATUS OF DIVISION 76- 1,057,604 15,621 
O 8973 JEWELLERY OF GOLD,SILVER OR PLATINUM 1,030,814 7,939 
M 7415 AIR CONDITIONING MACH.SELF-CONTAINED AND PARTS 1,020,753 16,787 
O 7611 TELEVISION RECEIVERS,COLOUR 968,940 14,250 
O 8510 FOOTWEAR 911,503 6,470 
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Table A2: Top Ten Imports in 1999 
 
country class sitc2 description value PRODY 
C
h
in
a 
I 7764 ELECTRONIC MICROCIRCUITS 7,532,605 17,052 
I 7649 PARTS OF APPARATUS OF DIVISION 76- 5,363,549 15,621 
M 7284 MACH.& APPLIANCES FOR SPEZIALIZED PARTICULAR IND. 4,048,955 19,017 
I 7599 PARTS OF AND ACCESSORIES SUITABLE FOR 751.2-,752- 3,788,179 14,434 
I 5833 POLYSTYRENE AND ITS COPOLYMERS 2,583,205 19,903 
I 7721 ELECT.APP.SUCH AS SWITCHES,RELAYS,FUSES,PWGS ETC. 2,283,884 14,682 
I 6531 FABRICS,WOVEN OF CONTINUOUS SYNTH.TEXTIL.MATERIALS 2,247,753 10,051 
O 7924 AIRCRAFT EXCEEDING AN UNLADEN WEIGHT OF 15000 KG 2,240,222 12,637 
M 7788 OTHER ELECT.MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 2,184,398 13,171 
I 6746 SHEETS & PLATES,ROLLED;THICKNESS OF LESS THAN 3MM. 2,180,581 12,025 
C
h
in
a 
H
K
 S
A
R
 
I 7764 ELECTRONIC MICROCIRCUITS 9,197,478 17,052 
I 7599 PARTS OF AND ACCESSORIES SUITABLE FOR 751.2-,752- 6,878,303 14,434 
M 8942 CHILDRENS TOYS,INDOOR GAMES,ETC. 6,136,434 13,995 
I 7649 PARTS OF APPARATUS OF DIVISION 76- 5,010,606 15,621 
O 8510 FOOTWEAR 4,960,661 6,470 
O 8310 TRAVEL GOODS,HANDBAGS,BRIEF-CASES,PURSES,SHEATHS 3,532,912 8,162 
M 8851 WATCHES,WATCH MOVEMENTS AND CASES 2,866,234 22,093 
O 7643 RADIOTELEGRAPHIC & RADIOTELEPHONIC TRANSMITTERS 2,755,613 20,363 
O 8451 JERSEYS,PULL-OVERS,TWINSETS,CARDIGANS,KNITTED 2,664,494 4,012 
M 7712 OTHER ELECTRIC POWER MACHINERY,PARTS OF 771- 2,225,244 13,050 
In
d
ia
 
I 5222 INORGANIC ACIDS AND OXYGEN COMPOUNDS OF NON-METAL 924,435 4,738 
I 5629 FERTILIZERS,N.E.S. 660,715 7,131 
I 7599 PARTS OF AND ACCESSORIES SUITABLE FOR 751.2-,752- 432,886 14,434 
I 7849 OTHER PARTS & ACCESSORIES OF MOTOR VEHICLES 356,810 19,647 
I 5623 MINERAL OR CHEMICAL FERTILIZERS.POTASSIC 339,131 6,173 
I 5112 CYCLIC HYDROCARBONS 318,569 17,291 
O 8983 GRAMOPHONE RECORDS AND SIM.SOUND RECORDINGS 318,389 25,318 
O 7932 SHIPS,BOATS AND OTHER VESSELS 297,038 11,211 
O 7938 TUGS,SPECIAL PURPOSE VESSELS,FLOATING STRUCTURES 268,552 9,027 
I 7649 PARTS OF APPARATUS OF DIVISION 76- 256,785 15,621 
In
d
o
n
es
ia
 
I 5112 CYCLIC HYDROCARBONS 474,619 17,291 
I 5111 ACYCLIC HYDROCARBONS 306,753 17,334 
I 7849 OTHER PARTS & ACCESSORIES OF MOTOR VEHICLES 296,772 19,647 
I 5989 CHEMICAL PRODUCTS AND PREPARATIONS,N.E.S. 283,198 18,135 
I 5121 ACYCLIC ALCOHOLS & THEIR HALOGENATED,DERIVATIVES 245,741 15,580 
M 7284 MACH.& APPLIANCES FOR SPEZIALIZED PARTICULAR IND. 222,606 19,017 
O 7938 TUGS,SPECIAL PURPOSE VESSELS,FLOATING STRUCTURES 217,835 9,027 
O 7821 MOTOR VEHICLES FOR TRANSPORT OF GOODS/MATERIALS 210,690 16,254 
I 6782 SEAMLESSTUBES AND PIPES;BLANKS FOR TUBES & PIPES 196,176 7,611 
O 7234 CONSTRUCTION AND MINING MACHINERY,N.E.S. 195,787 15,514 
Ja
p
an
 
I 7764 ELECTRONIC MICROCIRCUITS 11,926,291 17,052 
I 7599 PARTS OF AND ACCESSORIES SUITABLE FOR 751.2-,752- 6,881,834 14,434 
O 7810 PASSENGER MOTOR CARS,FOR TRANSPORT OF PASS.& GOOD 6,213,942 16,660 
O 7924 AIRCRAFT EXCEEDING AN UNLADEN WEIGHT OF 15000 KG 4,220,178 12,637 
O 7523 COMPLETE DIGITAL CENTRAL PROCESSING UNITS 4,072,387 24,163 
I 7649 PARTS OF APPARATUS OF DIVISION 76- 3,444,135 15,621 
O 7524 DIGITAL CENTRAL STORAGE UNITS,SEPARATELY CONSIGNED 3,394,213 16,289 
O 8451 JERSEYS,PULL-OVERS,TWINSETS,CARDIGANS,KNITTED 3,047,889 4,012 
O 8310 TRAVEL GOODS,HANDBAGS,BRIEF-CASES,PURSES,SHEATHS 2,664,623 8,162 
O 8510 FOOTWEAR 2,581,682 6,470 
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I 7764 ELECTRONIC MICROCIRCUITS 13,540,410 17,052 
M 7284 MACH.& APPLIANCES FOR SPEZIALIZED PARTICULAR IND. 2,154,851 19,017 
I 7599 PARTS OF AND ACCESSORIES SUITABLE FOR 751.2-,752- 1,815,882 14,434 
I 7649 PARTS OF APPARATUS OF DIVISION 76- 1,794,350 15,621 
I 5989 CHEMICAL PRODUCTS AND PREPARATIONS,N.E.S. 1,382,362 18,135 
M 7788 OTHER ELECT.MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 1,341,709 13,171 
I 7763 DIODES,TRANSISTORS AND SIM.SEMI-CONDUCTOR DEVICES 1,339,290 12,103 
I 7721 ELECT.APP.SUCH AS SWITCHES,RELAYS,FUSES,PWGS ETC. 1,319,443 14,682 
I 7768 PIEZO-ELECTRIC CRYSTALS,MOUNTED,PARTS OF 776- 1,212,723 15,380 
M 8710 OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS AND APPARATUS 1,058,776 16,677 
M
al
ay
si
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I 7768 PIEZO-ELECTRIC CRYSTALS,MOUNTED,PARTS OF 776- 9,191,687 15,380 
I 7764 ELECTRONIC MICROCIRCUITS 8,325,827 17,052 
I 7599 PARTS OF AND ACCESSORIES SUITABLE FOR 751.2-,752- 2,519,590 14,434 
I 7649 PARTS OF APPARATUS OF DIVISION 76- 1,690,317 15,621 
M 7788 OTHER ELECT.MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 1,298,959 13,171 
I 7722 PRINTED CIRCUITS AND PARTS THEREOF 1,216,008 13,784 
I 7721 ELECT.APP.SUCH AS SWITCHES,RELAYS,FUSES,PWGS ETC. 1,143,346 14,682 
M 7284 MACH.& APPLIANCES FOR SPEZIALIZED PARTICULAR IND. 1,140,345 19,017 
I 7763 DIODES,TRANSISTORS AND SIM.SEMI-CONDUCTOR DEVICES 999,865 12,103 
O 7810 PASSENGER MOTOR CARS,FOR TRANSPORT OF PASS.& GOOD 886,831 16,660 
S
in
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I 7764 ELECTRONIC MICROCIRCUITS 17,784,221 17,052 
I 7599 PARTS OF AND ACCESSORIES SUITABLE FOR 751.2-,752- 9,063,500 14,434 
O 7524 DIGITAL CENTRAL STORAGE UNITS,SEPARATELY CONSIGNED 3,258,148 16,289 
I 7649 PARTS OF APPARATUS OF DIVISION 76- 2,822,151 15,621 
I 7768 PIEZO-ELECTRIC CRYSTALS,MOUNTED,PARTS OF 776- 2,289,477 15,380 
M 7788 OTHER ELECT.MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 2,274,292 13,171 
I 7721 ELECT.APP.SUCH AS SWITCHES,RELAYS,FUSES,PWGS ETC. 1,931,954 14,682 
M 7284 MACH.& APPLIANCES FOR SPEZIALIZED PARTICULAR IND. 1,870,827 19,017 
I 7763 DIODES,TRANSISTORS AND SIM.SEMI-CONDUCTOR DEVICES 1,659,250 12,103 
O 8983 GRAMOPHONE RECORDS AND SIM.SOUND RECORDINGS 1,602,773 25,318 
T
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I 7764 ELECTRONIC MICROCIRCUITS 14,275,299 17,052 
O 7524 DIGITAL CENTRAL STORAGE UNITS,SEPARATELY CONSIGNED 6,301,691 16,289 
M 7284 MACH.& APPLIANCES FOR SPEZIALIZED PARTICULAR IND. 4,671,837 19,017 
I 7599 PARTS OF AND ACCESSORIES SUITABLE FOR 751.2-,752- 2,184,552 14,434 
M 7416 MACH.PLANT & SIM.LAB.EQUIP.INVOLV.A TEMP.CHANGE 1,840,257 13,071 
I 7721 ELECT.APP.SUCH AS SWITCHES,RELAYS,FUSES,PWGS ETC. 1,730,691 14,682 
I 5989 CHEMICAL PRODUCTS AND PREPARATIONS,N.E.S. 1,706,517 18,135 
I 7763 DIODES,TRANSISTORS AND SIM.SEMI-CONDUCTOR DEVICES 1,691,680 12,103 
I 6725 BLOOMS,BILLETS,SLABS & SHEET BARS OF IRON OR STEEL 1,609,921 7,648 
M 7788 OTHER ELECT.MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 1,493,057 13,171 
T
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I 7768 PIEZO-ELECTRIC CRYSTALS,MOUNTED,PARTS OF 776- 2,664,272 15,380 
I 7599 PARTS OF AND ACCESSORIES SUITABLE FOR 751.2-,752- 2,239,371 14,434 
I 7764 ELECTRONIC MICROCIRCUITS 2,202,747 17,052 
O 7924 AIRCRAFT EXCEEDING AN UNLADEN WEIGHT OF 15000 KG 1,611,338 12,637 
I 6997 ARTICLES OF IRON OR STEEL, N.E.S. 1,329,656 14,589 
I 7721 ELECT.APP.SUCH AS SWITCHES,RELAYS,FUSES,PWGS ETC. 1,003,479 14,682 
M 7788 OTHER ELECT.MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 872,248 13,171 
M 8939 MISCELLANEOUS ART.OF MATERIALS OF DIV.58 811,267 18,789 
I 7761 TELEVISION PICTURE TUBES,CATHODE RAY 803,673 12,841 
I 7849 OTHER PARTS & ACCESSORIES OF MOTOR VEHICLES 679,681 19,647 
 
 
